PayPal's Move Into Offline Retail: Balance of Power Means Cooperation, Not Competition

I've been wondering about the payment value chain. Specifically how PayPal (and to some extent, Square) moving toward offline retail will shape the industry. Specifically, can its P2P apps aggregate consumer attention and lead to less industry power for Visa and Mastercard.

Today's consumer transaction landscape is as follows:

• Peer to peer (P2P). PayPal and Square (with PayPal app, Venmo, and Cash App). Note that P2P transactions do not have to go through Visa and Mastercard's networks.
• Business to consumer (B2C) online. 
• Visa and Mastercard  - consumers puts in their credit card info online.
• PayPal buttons.
• Business to consumer (B2C) offline
• Visa and Mastercard.
• Apple Pay and Google Pay. These wallets mostly just wraps around credit/debit cards. 
• PayPal and Square both have debit cards that consumers can put into Apple/Google Pay.

Note that PayPal already dominate P2P and have solid presence in B2C online, but weak in B2C offline.  

That's why I'm really interested in PayPal's initiatives to use QR codes. Here's a tweet back in February when I was thinking out loud:

Why aren't more physical stores letting people pay with QR codes? (Like Starbucks app). Bypass $V and $MA right? And why wouldn't $pypl and $SQ push this method to extend their reach in offline transaction?
— mspacey (@mspacey4415) February 26, 2020
 

My original thought process was something like this: 

• The P2P apps (PayPal, Venmo, Cash app) already have ability to transfer money without going through V/MA. Brick and mortar retail is the missing piece before theses apps could be used anywhere.   
• You can also store money in these PayPal/Venmo/Cash App. So these apps can technically replace banks and credit cards. 
• The more transactions go through these apps, the more leverage they have. For example, if consumers rely on Venmo for all their transactions, including at retail stores, then Venmo can threaten to steer consumers away from V/MA's networks, and extract fee concessions. 

I've since updated my thinking. Why? Because if the above hypothesis is true, Google Pay and Apple Pay will be circumvented and rendered irrelevant. 

Is that realistic? Probably not. The payment space is so big that Apple and Google are unlikely to step aside without some competitive response.

how does Apple Pay / Google Pay respond to Paypal $PYPL's ambition in brick & mortar payments? it can bypass apple / google Pay with QR codes

— mspacey (@mspacey4415) June 4, 2020

The responses could come in 2 ways - co-op and retaliation. Google Pay and Apple Pay can easily co-opt the QR code movement by adding that features as well. The wallets can also retaliate by pushing into P2P space. In fact Google Pay already has P2P features but doesn't advertise it much. It's not very smooth now, but it works.

The payment sectors has a balance of power that prevents any one player from dominating. 

So what does PayPal really get out of this QR code move? I think it mostly furthers that balance of power - as if to say "hey Google/Apple/Visa/Mastercard, if you try to cut us out of the payment profit pool, we have the means to strike back."

It's building a bunch of nuclear warheads pointing at each other. Threat of mutual destruction upholds industry economics.

In the meantime, PayPal is broadcasting that they are open to cooperation, and not looking to cut any one out.

I now think the multi-player landscape will hold and no one sub-sector or company will dominate. PayPal, Square, Apple, Google, Visa and Mastercard are frenemies that will cooperate instead of compete. They will collectively gain leverage over the banks.

With expensive growth stocks, the key is TAM and strategy. If the TAM is vast, as long as the strategy works, companies can grow into it. I think that describes both PayPal and Square. They are both long term buys.

Facebook and Google: How Online Ads Will Do In the Next Recession

Investors of Facebook (FB) and Google (GOOGL) have been worried about privacy issues and now anti-trust issues for the past couple years. I think an even more important question though, is how cyclical are their ad revenues?

Theoretically, advertising should be highly cyclical. Advertising acts as weapons in business wars for market shares gains, which primarily happens during an expansion.

Think about all the subscale/unprofitable startups that spend over 100% of revenue on sales/marketing. They’re willing to spend lavishly on advertising under the logic that market share begets more market share (network effect); that they will be able to retain customers, and therefore the lifetime value of those customers should exceed sales and marketing expenses. These companies are generally cash flow negative and depend on external funding. In a liquidity risk-off situation that funding get cut off, and their advertising spends on FB and GOOGL could come to a sudden halt.

In short, companies (especially SaaS guys) are treating advertising expenses as capital expenditures, and thus advertising revenues should reflect more cyclical characteristics.

This points to a downside scenario for Facebook and Google (disclosure: I’m long both). We will at some point hit a recession. Google and Facebooks’ revenues may not just stop growing but actually decline (volume and price both drop). Then you have operating deleveraging, lower margins, and earnings and free cash flow gets destroyed.

What Happened During 2008-2009

The easiest way to see how something might fare in a recession is check how well it did during 2008-2009. There the data is surprisingly good – online ads actually did well during the great recession. Google’s revenue growth slowed but never turned negative. 

Here’s a Harvard Business Review article from 2009 that discusses the strength of online advertising:

“Despite a deepening recession, marketers spent 14% more on online ads over the first three quarters of 2008 than they did over the same time frame in the previous year.”

There are structural and cyclical components to this phenomenon. The structural part is easy - digital ads were in its early innings during that time as people were still moving online.

The cyclical component is also intuitive. Companies become more budget conscious in a recession. They want more measurable ROI and more precise targeting as opposed to a scattershot approach. Both factors favor digital ads over broad based TV ads.

People also lean on their social networks more in a downturn, for job networking as well as emotional support. This resilient usage of social networks makes it a good media for ads. 

Differences Then vs Now, Conclusion

Granted, the current situation has important difference compared to 2008. Online ads are no longer in the early innings – 2019 will mark the first year digital ads make up over 50% share of advertising market. Furthermore, Google’s revenue was growing 50-60% a year heading into the 2007 downturn compared to the mid to high teens growth rate it now shows.

Both Facebook and Google have made strong moves into video advertising, where they still have the advantage of more quantifiable ROI and precise targeting against traditional TV. However, the competitive edge is less overwhelming nowadays with smart TVs like Roku that can also do targeted advertising.

The two companies will also have to fend off new entrant Amazon.

Despite these differences, some of the behavioral patterns should still hold. In a recession I think people will still network more, lean on their social circles more, and probably spend more time online searching for jobs and information.

Weighing these factors, my recession scenario for Google and Facebook is as follows:

• Ad prices should take a hit to maintain ad buyer ROI – (as conversion rates go down in a recession).
• Volume down 5-10%.
• Overall mid teens decline in revenue.
• Margins and earnings will take a hit and stock prices will get punished as well. 

Looking beyond though, there’s no question FB/GOOGL have the balance sheet to survive a recession. Once recession recovers, ad volumes would spike back up.

So for the long term investor, the question goes back to structural growth opportunities. Here the prospects are bright. Both companies continue to develop new products, both for consumers and for advertisers. Both have established strong presences in digital video advertising and taking the lead in trialing new formats to optimize advertiser ROI. From that perspective, they’re still in the early innings.

Framing the Questions for GOOGL

Wall Street Journal has a good article that spells out the various products underlying Google's search advertising platform. It is an excellent five minute primer. Here's the link.

The search advertising business is not one product, but various components that interact to make a market place. The article shows that Google owns and dominates all sides of that market:

• Sell side (for publishers to publish) 
• Publishers use "ad servers". These ad servers has information on what spaces on media properties are selling ad placement. The ad servers provide that supply info to the market place.
• Large publishers typically use its server, commonly known as DoubleClick for Publishers. (DoubleClick for Publishers and AdX are now tied together in one product called Google Ad Manager.)
• Smaller publishers often use Google’s AdSense.
• Mobile app publishers use Google’s AdMob.

• Buy side (provide ad purchasing tools)
• Google Ads (formerly known as “AdWords”) for buyers to bid for search ads placement on Google (its own property)
• DV360 for (for Display and Video) for buyers to bid for video ad placement. This does placement even outside of Google properties.

• Exchanges 
• Googles owns AdX which is the largest exchange with about 50% market share

• Media Properties
• Google search
• Youtube
• Others

• Analytics

There's plenty of firepower for regulators and antitrust guys here! 

For one, how can you have a market where all participants are owned by the same party? There are numerous other issues. Just as an example, the bundling is problematic. Google Ad Manager is a bundle of 1) DoubleClick for Publishers and 2) AdX. Combining a sell side tool with an exchange is not good optics, since the exchange can favor its own publishers.

Another example is analytics. This is an issue because it acts as the "referee" of the effectiveness of other Google search products. I can easily see regulators demand Google separating this out.

In short, plenty of ways regulators can cut them up.


The question then, is what pricing power or otherwise benefits did Google derive from owning all of this?  If this is all broken up, would GOOGL suffer economically? if so, how much? 

I suspect these questions are unanswerable. Google (and its parents Alphabet) is just not very transparent, particularly for a megacap. I cannot tell how much money they make from Ad exchange versus their own property selling ads, versus the various buyside/sell side tools (including ad servers?).  

If anti-trust is going to be the big overhang over GOOGL stock, then not having the transparency to answer these questions is not going to help. 

For now Google does not even break out Youtube. So they have a long way to go. 

Week Ending 5/2/2015: Random Notes and Portfolio Review

I missed a home run last month and it hurt. Impac Mortgage (IMH) was the one. I’ve been following that stock on and off for 3 years. A week before earning came out, I had a hunch 1Q15 was going to be a good quarter, so I sat down, went through a rather detailed model and looked over my projected 1Q15 earnings. I passed, thinking the was not worth the risk and reward. When the actual earning came out it was a multiple of my forecast!! I was stunned  (I got the volume pretty much right on but was way off on the margin!). The stock ran up 100%+ in past month alone. Never have I put in that much work in a stock and turned out that wrong before. I mean if I was a portfolio manager at some fund and had a hunch about this stock, and I got my sector analyst to take a deep dive. He comes back saying it's a no go, then the stock goes up 100%...this is the sort of stuff that could get you fired.

So that hurt my confidence. That and the fact that I’ve been very uneasy with the market made me go through my portfolio again.


Healthcare portfolio.  This is a multi-leg investment to capture the long term trend in America’s aging population. I have a mix of managed care, hospitals, pharmaceuticals, and supply chain players that balance out each other.

Managed care ran up a lot in 1Q15 and was a major contributor to my out performance year to date. I decided to cut this down a little bit due to full valuation. I also see near term risk in the next year as we get closer to election year and Republicans will undoubtedly make some noise about Obamacare. But overall this healthcare portfolio is a very long term play and there’s nothing here that I would think of selling if the overall market drops 50% tomorrow.

That said, after a very successful run the past year, my expected return in the next few years is not great – maybe mid/high single digit annualized return. So if something with better risk and reward comes alone I could pare this down further.


Housing portfolio.  This is really more like housing finance and is a mix of title insurance, originator/servicers, mortgage REITS and mortgage heavy banks. The big picture idea is to go long household formation and existing home sales in the next 5-10 years. Unlike the healthcare portfolio, there are some pretty speculative names in here like Nationstar, PennyMac Financial, AGNC…etc. But I’ve cut them down to a point where I’m pretty comfortable for all remaining positions, and certainly on a portfolio basis. 

The core group here is title insurance, which I went through recently thinking about adding. Unfortunately the group look fairly valued. In terms of technicals, Fidelity National Financial (FNF) is a name showing some weaknesses. It is hovering around its resistance level and could see a big break on the downside if next Monday’s earning turn out to be a bust. If that happens I will simply take it on the chin. 

Tankers. I cut down some TNK and bought some more DHT. In the past few weeks TNK stock price has moved up to a point it became too large of a position. I'm also worried that Aframax sector (which TNK is heavy in) will not benefit as much as say VLCC or Suezmax sector. Hence the rotation into DHT, which owns mostly VLCC and Suezmax ships. Luckily, I did this adjustment right before TNK stock took a beating the past few days. The tanker trade is ~6% of my total portfolio and I have 4 stocks sharing the risk. What's preventing me from getting bigger here? 1) This is obviously a very speculative trade and cannot be long term. 2) Global crude oil demand is highly dependent on China, so the tanker trade is to some degree a long China trade -- and I'm already very long China in the portfolio.


Beijing Enterprises Holdings (392.HK). This ran up some 20% and I kept adding to my position on the way up. Although the gain is mostly due to extremely lucky timing, this is a very long term investment for me. I would consider adding more Chinese gas distributors, but only at the right price.


One big China/HK trade basket. Welling (382.HK) has ran up dramatically and I also added on the way up. But I see less upside here and will likely take my profit if the HK market takes a turn for the worse. In recent weeks I piled in and added a mix of indices and (mostly infrastructure) stocks to capture an expected spike in liquidity as well as A-H share premium.

But now that H-shares momentum has flattened out, I’m very worried about the A-share bubble popping and how that might spill over to H-shares. I'm actually investigating ways to short China as a whole while staying long in my current H-share positions, which are all reasonably valued if not outright cheap. I have tight stop losses on every one of these trades and will let the market decide for me.

Updating my views on Apple and Google:

Apple. I’m kind of surprised that the stock did not move that much given the very strong quarter. Demand for the stock could be exhausted. Part of my thesis is a "short squeeze" for those who still don't own AAPL and lags the index as a result. I now see that even a $200bn capital return plan cannot scare the implicit shorts. My original thesis could be flawed and I may cut down or exit instead.

Google. I’m holding on despite the temptation to exit given the persistently negative market sentiments here. I did some rough numbers again. My timeframe is 5 years for this. What’s the worst case? Conservatively, I think EPS can grow 8% a year. It is unlikely to be less given the solid top line growth runway and how much room they have to cut cost, and everything I know of Google.

• 5 years from now EPS would be up 47%. But let’s say 1yr forward multiple (ex-cash) goes down to 17, that would be roughly an -18% hit. Combine EPS gain and multiple loss yields ~29% total return in 5yr, which would be about 5-5.5% CAGR. That is my worst case. 
• On the other hand I think the upside is double in 5yr or about 15% IRR. 
• Given the strong expected EPS growth, forward PE would have to drop to 12x at 2020 for me to lose money. 
• So I’m holding on to this. But maybe get smaller if price moves against me.

The exposures I listed above add up to almost 70% of my portfolio. I’m in the process of revisiting my entire investment approach and don’t expect to add new names. If the market crashes 30% tomorrow, the exposures I'm less sure about (roughly half of what I listed above) would be stopped out, leaving the real long term positions intact. 

Keep It Simple, Buy Apple and Google

I tend to write about smallish and mediocre companies on this blog, but those are just a portion of my portfolio. In fact, about half of my portfolio are highly liquid large caps that I consider high quality and intend to hold over the long run.

The problem with this mixed approach of "cigar butt" versus quality at fair price is I end up spending most of my time on the former. Built to last companies just don't require as much attention as risky ones. When I buy a "quality" company my intention is to let it cruise along, check in once in a while to see if the thesis still holds, and perhaps add on the dips. This has all worked out very well so far. The problem is there's a strong temptation to equate "large" with "safe", and perhaps run the risk of complacency. I hope writing this blog will help prevent that.

I'm under no illusions that I have any unique advantage when investing in these names. The thing is you don't always need an edge. Investing is not a zero sum game. Nor do you get points for creativity. I think some people read Joel Greenblatt and obsessively ask themselves "whats my edge? is this obscure enough?" But sometimes the crowd is right, and the best opportunities are the obvious ones. (more that here.)

With the market being volatile the past few months, I took the chance to get into Google and Apple at the lows. At today's prices (GOOGL at $565 and AAPL at $126), I would still buy them if not for the fact that they're already full sized positions.

Google

There's a decent chance this can double in 5 years. The way this works out, I think, is earnings double in 5 years (implying a a highly achievable 14% earnings CAGR). If earnings are still growing > 10% at the end of that period, then the market will put on a high P/E which doubles the share price.

For a company that grew its net revenue at 20% in 2014, Google is priced very reasonably, (I look at this in terms of GAAP earnings, and back out the value of net cash, which gets me to <20x 2016E earnings). This deal is available due to worries about what mobile means for Google. Google still makes most of its money from text searches, the fear is that with the world shifting toward mobile and "apps", Google's earnings growth will slow or even decline.

That seems exaggerated to me. Google owns Android and YouTube, so they do have a strong presence in mobile. Ok, they have not really monetize those two yet, but is it that hard to imagine they eventually will? Also, there are 2 trends that converges "mobile" together with traditional internet, where Google clearly dominates. One is that websites increasingly serve up the "mobile" versions, which are getting so sophisticated that there's no difference between normal internet site and an "app". Second, as phones get bigger and tablets more functional, there's less of a difference between the "mobile" world and the "desktop" world. In that sense cell phone, tablet, laptop...etc are all just screens where people interact with the internet.

In 2014, gross profit grew 20%+ while adjusted pretax profit was up only 11%. This is due to Google's high R&D and other investments. These are discretionary investments though. If they just keep expenses under control, they can easily "show" a much higher earning growth.

I'm no expert in tech, but Fred Wilson is. In this recent interview (around 37th minute), he was asked "Can YouTube be bigger than Google search?" to which he exclaimed "Yes! Easily!". Wilson also pointed out that Google's strength in data and the fact that it's still run by its founders.

Apple

For years I had a hard time getting comfortable with Apple. With technology changing so fast, I have no idea what products they will be selling in 10 years, so how can I put anything more than a 10x multiple on this? My thinking has changed into this: it doe not matter. Sure, eventually there is going to be tougher competition from Asia, but I just need to make sure 1) in the interim they will rake it in the next 2 years so that cash is worth something, 2) there are no close competitor in the upscale product /ecosystem / "fashion tech" segment.

Apple made an absurd $18bn in the quarter ending December 2014. In one quarter alone, they made more than the entire market value of some large cap companies! Surely this is peak earning, no? I think there could be more. Growth opportunity could come from 1) higher iPhone penetration in emerging market. Apple's market share in China was only 16% at Oct 2014. Could have doubled at this point, but certainly there's some room to run. Similar idea with France, Germany, Italy..etc. 2) the bigger iPhone 6+ has higher price points. 3) Apple Watch opens another revenue stream that could offset iPad weaknesses. 4) Upside options such as Apple Pay, partnership with IBM, healthcare initiatives could all work out. 5) Apple solidifies itself as a "fashion tech" brand and sells eye glasses, hats, or whatever to fanboys for $400 a pop.

What's the upside? Say earnings grow another 30% in a few years, put on a higher multiple and we could see 40-50% gain from the current price. There's a technical aspect that could accelerate the gains. With Apple being some 3.5% of the SP500, fund managers who are underweight Apple (and implicitly shorting it) could face a short squeeze, especially if iPhone 6 continues its spectacular run and Apple start doing some buybacks.

The downside is Apple Watch turns out to be a flop, which not only fails to replace iPad sales, but also disproves the "Apple as fashion/luxury tech" theory and demoralize Apple boosters. Also, if iPhone 6 sales stalls later this year, the market would reasserts that this is a cyclical business unworthy of a high multiple. This is not a stable buy and hold. The downside is real and I would have to risk manage this if prices fall below my cost basis.



Of the two, I like Google better and will allow it more time to play out.